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Tunnel vision 
 
 
(Nietzsche, On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life)  
  
When Wittgenstein was young, he wrote a small book intended to solve all of philosophy
problems with language, called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). A self-taught 
philosopher with an academic background in engineering, Wittgenstein had studied logic and 
philosophy under the supervision of Bertrand Russell, but the Tractatus was not written inside 
university walls. Wittgenstein wrote this small book on the front-line, during the First World 
War, in intellectual solitude, without any peers and without any feedback from his supervisor. 
After the war, Wittgenstein showed the book to Russell who immediately recognized its 
brilliance. The book was very well received by the Cambridge community of analytic 
philosophers and by the Vienna Circle. Later, Russell persuaded Wittgenstein to present it as a 
PhD thesis at Cambridge. The PhD defence, held in 1929, seven years later after the publication 
of the Tractatus, was a mere formality held among close friends  G. E. Moore and Russell 
were in the commission. Although Wittgenstein was granted the doctoral degree by his friends, 
this book was never something one would call new that 
the degree was an exception, granted to an exceptionally gifted philosopher. But as an academic 
writer, Wittgenstein had failed.  
As an intellectual piece, the Tractatus is a strange beast, written by a student with the voice of 
a professor. Its process of creation resembles that of a fictional piece: the author is struck by 
inspiration, labours in solitude, and then translates the vision onto paper. Yet the Tractatus was 
not meant to be a work of fiction, rather to have the final say in a conceptual debate about the 
relation between language and world. This little book was meant to be the end of all 
philosophical conversation, the final nail in its coffin. Written outside the university, the 
Tractatus had the ambition of ending the academic conversation in philosophy, while it refused 
to engage with that conversation. This was not fair-play on any account. The Tractatus was 
never intended to be an academic text; it had no footnotes, no references to other authors. It was 
a vision of language that Wittgenstein had shared with the world.  
-back: everybody tried to draw 
Wittgenstein into the conversation he had fled from. But Wittgenstein could not endure 
involving the Tractatus in any battle of ideas. Initially, he claimed he had been misunderstood 
by everybody, even by Russell. Later, during the 1930s, after already embarking on other 
projects and writings, Wittgenstein admitted that he had been wrong in the Tractatus. But it 
was too late. The philosophers of the day kept asking him to comment on those ideas that he 
had come to see as mistakes. Sometimes Wittgenstein would just whistle a tune from Schubert, 
or turn his back and recite Indian poems, in response to their annoying demands. The book had 
gained a life of its own, against its creator. People wanted to talk about it then, and still today, 
conferences and books are written on Wittgenstein  
One can only wonder if Wittgenstein Tractatus would have resulted in such a strange piece 
had it been written inside the university, after debates with peers. As soon as an academic text 
is published or just shared with others, it gets placed in another context. Academic writers lose 
all authority over their own text and are forced to approach it as readers, with unfamiliar eyes. 
This is when the work starts to rise against its author: even if the author made no mistake, just 
by being cited, read and discussed, the work gets a whole new meaning decided by others. 
Academic writing is conversational in a way that other kinds of writing are not. Wittgenstein 
did not know this, he insisted on shushing the wave of words stirred by his text. 
A piece of academic writing does not stand on its own, it stands on other pieces of writing that 
came before it. This is what the footnotes and references signify. Nobody writes alone in 
academia: we start from others, we embed quotes and paraphrases in our own texts, then we 
discuss these texts with others, revising and rewriting. Academic writing is about weaving 
never-ending threads of texts-as-conversation, both in speech and in writing. The academic 
conversation can be overwhelming: it went on before we entered the discipline and will go on 
without us. The world created through this conversation cannot be grasped by one mind. It is 
not the world of one author, one vision, but a universe created by thousands of writers, each 
adding a minuscule layer to the existing textual corpus. In this vast universe of pre-existing 
writings, we are pulled and pushed in different directions by texts which seduce us. Sometimes 
we manage to find a moment of equilibrium, in which our ideas, facts and words align perfectly 
into a vision. Every writer knows these moments when words just flow out of the keyboard or 
pen, when everything seems to match perfectly, because we have found an a balance between 
what we say and the world of texts resisting us. These moments of equilibrium close us off to 
other possibilities of seeing and thinking. We get tunnel vision. There is something hypnotic 
when ideas are constructed in a harmonious way such that the parts fit the whole: because it is 
so well formulated, it seems true. 
In academia, we need to have conversations about our texts because the danger of getting tunnel 
vision is present a
undergoes a phase when certain facts, concepts, and words fit so well into a model that any 
alternative perspective seems impossible. Once we manage to crystallize our theories into some 
kind of model, we want to settle down in that moment of peace and give up looking for other 
solutions. Once we finish the text and confront it with other
construction fall apart. If we do not find others to discuss our own writings with, we become 
the people of one idea, one picture, one perspective. Finding a nice match between theories and 
facts is always accompanied by a feeling of accomplishment and finitude. We fell that we 
deserve a rest from all that writing. We found something, is that not enough? This is when a 
static vision becomes rigidity and intellectual death. 
Academic writing always entails a discussion with others, either before, during, or after the 
writing. In the university, our writing is exposed to others systematically. The writing of a 
dissertation or a thesis is exemplary in that way: it is a process of writing a first draft, then 
getting comments from the supervisors, then rewriting, discussing, repeat for N times. Each 
interaction makes us see our own writing anew, from the perspective of others who keep adding 
points of reference into our universe, expanding our vision. When others read our work, 
comment on it, or even cite it, we are forced to dissociate ourselves from our own creation, to 
look at it again as if for the first time.  
with us after reading our text, the baby becomes emancipated. We relate to our writing 
differently, as strangers, and thus, we relate to ourselves in another way. The concern for ego-
boosting and recognition through publication must give way to something else, the concern for 
the truth. The issue at stake is no longer ourselves and our talent as writers or truth-tellers, but 
the text itself: the truth it expresses must be given a voice. 
red while writing has no 
name. Perhaps we could call it educational detachment from oneself. It is not just a new world 
that is made possible in the process of writing-discussion, but a new self, which can stand beside 
itself and not be trapped in any vision, no matter how enticing. 
Writing as a solitary activity has been described as a technology of the self, most famously by 
context, however, the change of self through writing gets a different meaning. It is still a 
technology of the self, but it becomes collective. Academic writing works only if inscribed in 
a larger process of reading, writing, commenting, discussing, rewriting, revisiting, defending 
lly writing with others in view of expressing a 
common truth. The truth does not rest in the text itself, but rather in the interaction it creates 
with the others, the readers. It lies in the middle. is never 
finished; it is 
only the text that is abandoned, but also the writerly self, with all the ego and pride of the 
author. When academic writing functions as a technology of the self, it works because it opens 
up a possibility for the writer to become someone else, to think differently, to leave the 
comfortable spot of equilibrium for something unknown. Only in those moments, when the 
writer writes just for the sake of truth itself, the text speaks by itself, instead of the author. The 
self has disappeared and something else is left to emerge in the empty space.  
When writing, we find ourselves following a path in which everything makes sense. Then we 
are exposed to the gaze of others as they read our texts. In this exposure, we are disconnected 
a second time from our own ideas. The writing stands detached from us as an object, ready to 
be scrutinized. Once we understand how others see our writing, only then do we see it for the 
first time. In this estrangement from our own creation lies the main educational point of 
academic writing: we model ideas, we believe in our own constructions, we bring them to the 
light of another
emerges: we get new ideas through conversation with others, and these ideas belong even less 
to us than the first batch. Ideas emerge in the middle ground of the conversation, and nobody 
can lay claim on their conception. To be able to see these new ideas, we must learn to detach 
less personal, more intersubjective. And then, after the first revision is done and one thinks 
harmony is achieved, the writer must be ready for yet another round of conversation, for yet 
another killing of the darlings. If time were not an issue, the rounds of academic writing would 
go on forever.  
Many years after the Tractatus was published, Wittgenstein wrote other things, less polished 
pieces that he did not find good enough to publish. At that time he was already a university 
lecturer. His writing style had changed. Looking at On Certainty, we already notice how 
Wittgenstein keeps referencing a lecture by Moore and several private conversations about that 
lecture. He is no longer the solipsistic genius trapped in a universe the size of a bottle. He 
later writings were composed after many discussions with his colleagues and his students, as 
an answer to these. He urged the students to abandon philosophy because he thought that it 
cannot be done, not in academia anyway. But he himself could not think if it weren
seminars he conducted. Wittgenstein needed the university to confront his ideas and to never 
be trapped again in that bottle. 
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